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Animals at War: The Status of “Animal Soldiers” under 
International Humanitarian Law 
Karsten Nowrot ∗ 
Abstract: »Tiere im Krieg: Der Status von ‚Tier-Soldaten‘ im humanitären Völ-
kerrecht«. In February 2014 the Taliban revealed the capture of a British mili-
tary working dog in Afghanistan and posted a video of their captive on the in-
ternet. Taking this recent incident as a starting point, the contribution aims to 
evaluate some aspects relating to the issue of a possible incorporation of “ani-
mal soldiers” into the scope of application of international humanitarian law. 
For this purpose, the analysis proceeds in four main steps. In the first part, it is 
argued that international humanitarian law – although so far largely neglected 
in the respective discourses – is for a variety of reasons a particularly suitable 
research object from the perspective of a political theory of animal rights. Sub-
sequently, a brief overview will be given of the current status – or rather non-
status – of animals in the realm of the ius in bello. The third part addresses and 
discusses some of the chances resulting from as well as in particular also con-
ceptual challenges arising in connection with a potential recognition of ani-
mals as international legal subjects having the status of combatants under the 
law of armed conflict. Finally, I sketch the probabilities of and possible condi-
tions for a successful implementation of this approach in practice. 
Keywords: Animal rights, public international law, international humanitarian 
law, international legal personality, armed conflict, combatants, animal citi-
zens, political theory of animal rights. 
1.  Introduction 
In February 2014 the world received news of a truly remarkable incident in 
Afghanistan which, amongst others, Pentagon officials considered as highly 
likely to be unprecedented. The Taliban revealed via Twitter the capture of a 
British military working dog and posted a video of their captive on the internet. 
The dog, a Belgian Malinois, was apparently wearing some kind of body armor 
and carried, among other things, certain electronic devices, a pistol, two rifles 
and a flashlight. Initially, many viewers of the video probably considered this 
announcement rather as some kind of bad joke. However, a few days later a 
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spokesperson for the international military coalition in Afghanistan confirmed 
that a military dog had indeed gone missing in action during a combat opera-
tion with coalition troops in the country’s eastern Laghman province during 
December 2013. Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid assured the public that 
the canine “was not injured and is not being mistreated.” Quite to the contrary, 
he was being held in a “safe place” and enjoyed a diet of chicken and beef 
kebabs specifically prepared for him by his captors. Furthermore, Mujahid 
indicated the possibility of the animal becoming involved in a future prisoners 
of war exchange between the coalition forces and the Taliban (see, e.g., Lon-
dono 2014; Soltis and Wires 2014). 
In reaction to this video and statement, one newspaper commentator rather 
wryly observed that it appeared somewhat reassuring that the Taliban at least for 
once seemed willing to comply with their international legal obligations as en-
shrined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Armed Conflicts (Arnu 2014). Although most certainly not devoid of a consid-
erable amount of irony, aside from this specific incident, in general terms it 
could be considered as one small indication for the practical relevance and 
timeliness of the topic “animals in armed conflicts and international humanitar-
ian law.” It is submitted that, far beyond this recent – and to some observers 
probably rather odd – episode, the international normative regime applicable in 
armed conflicts belongs to those comparatively rare areas of law that appear to 
be particularly suitable for illustrating vividly the potential practical importance 
of approaches that have been discussed for quite some time. Such approaches 
move towards not only recognition of legal entitlements for animals generally 
but also possible innovation arising from the recent fiercely debated political 
theory of animal rights. This is based on an extended understanding of citizen-
ship as prominently advocated by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (see espe-
cially Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; as well as, e.g., ibid. 2013, 2014; however, 
as an example of a rather critical account, see also Planinc 2014; and for an excel-
lent introduction, Ahlhaus and Niesen 2015, in this HSR Forum). 
Against this background, and mindful that the specific relevance of this legal 
field in the context of animal rights theory is undoubtedly not immediately obvi-
ous to everybody, the present contribution aims to evaluate and clarify the in 
principle age-old “social” phenomenon of animals as active participants in inter-
national and non-international armed conflicts within the normative framework of 
international humanitarian law.1 Thereby, it will not be possible to address com-
prehensively all of the respective questions and challenges in the course of this 
comparatively short contribution. Rather, this article largely confines itself to 
some preliminary thoughts and comments on a number of aspects relating to a 
                                                             
1  Although obviously from the perspective of international humanitarian law at least equally 
relevant and challenging, the issue of a possible legal status and protection of certain types 
of animals as “civilians” or non-combatants will not be further elaborated on here. 
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possible incorporation of what could be characterized as “animal soldiers” into 
the personal scope of international humanitarian law’s application (for a gen-
eral view on the scope of this area of law’s application see, e.g., Kleffner 
2013). This topic has so far only rarely been subjected to closer evaluation in 
animal rights literature (for a rather brief account see, e.g., Schäfer and Weimer 
2010, 116 et seq.).  
For this purpose, the following analysis proceeds in four main steps. In the 
second part of this contribution, it will be argued that and indicated why inter-
national humanitarian law – although until now largely neglected in the dis-
courses on animal rights – is for a variety of reasons a quite valuable research 
object, in particular from the perspective of the recently discussed political 
theory of animal rights (2). Subsequently, a brief overview will be given on the 
current status – or rather non-status – of animals in the realm of the ius in bello 
(3). The fourth section addresses and discusses some of the main chances re-
sulting from, as well as in particular also a number of conceptual challenges 
arising in connection with, the possible recognition of animals as international 
legal subjects having the status of combatants under the laws of armed conflict 
(4). Finally, in the concluding part, a sketch will be given of the probabilities of 
and possible conditions for successfully implementing this approach in prac-
tice. In this connection, an attempt will be made to establish something like a 
plausible connection between the issue of potential animal rights under interna-
tional humanitarian law on the one hand and new as well as future technologi-
cal developments in the realm of autonomous weapon systems on the other (5). 
2.  Some Underlying Reasons for the Importance of 
International Humanitarian Law in the Context of a 
Political Theory of Animal Rights 
In order to illustrate and support further the perception argued for in this con-
tribution, of international humanitarian law as a particularly noteworthy legal 
regime from the perspective of a political theory of animal rights, attention 
should at least briefly be drawn to four main aspects. First, it seems appropri-
ate, adopting a kind of factual-oriented perspective, to recall that animals have 
in principle for millennia not only belonged to the countless “civilian” victims 
of armed conflicts but are also actively involved in acts of war as – taking 
recourse to the terminology of international humanitarian law – so-called com-
batants (generally on the distinction between combatants and non-combatants 
see, e.g., Ipsen 2013; von Arnauld 2014, 500 et seq.). The variety of animal 
species deployed as “soldiers” in armed conflicts ranges from horses, ele-
phants, dogs, bats, camels, seals and pigeons to dolphins (Mühling 2014), bees, 
donkeys, belugas, oxen and cormorants, to mention but a few examples (see for 
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example Moore and Kosut 2013, 32 et seq.; Kinder 2013, 65 et seq.; Buciak 
2009; Janssen 2009; Pöppinghegel and Proctor 2009; Troy 2009; Cooper 2000, 
19 et seq.; Kistler 2011, 3 et seq.). In principle this finding still holds true. In 
addition to the services of dogs in Afghanistan mentioned earlier, let it suffice 
to draw attention to the fact that even the military operation “Neptune Spear” in 
Pakistan, which resulted in the elimination of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, 
was carried out by United States Navy SEALs with the assistance of a dog 
named Cairo, again a Belgian Malinois.2  
A second aspect worth noting from something like a cultural-psychological 
perspective is, on the one hand, the recurrently shared observation that joint 
participation in armed conflicts not infrequently results in the forming of rather 
close emotional bonds between human soldiers and their animals. They find 
their visible expression for example in the countless well-known stories about 
animals risking their lives to save human “comrades” in critical situations; but 
there are also comparable tales about human soldiers doing the same for their 
canines, horses and other animals assigned to assist them on the battlefield (see 
for example Frankel 2014; Leinonen 2013, 134 et seq.; Cooper 2000). These 
exceptionally close and in a notable way species-transcending relationships are 
most certainly first and foremost also a product of the extreme conditions pre-
vailing in situations of armed conflicts. It might not be an exaggeration to state 
that the respective combat situations are specifically characterized by some-
thing like a partial leveling of the otherwise still dominant categorical distinc-
tion between humans and animals, and thus the overcoming of well-known 
“cultural and economic obstacles to animal rights” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2011, 5). Admittedly, this partial leveling takes place in a particularly brutal 
way, bearing in mind that, in armed conflicts, all of the different participating 
species are equally confronted with a real possibility of violent death. 
On the other hand, albeit closely connected to the foregoing consideration, 
in the context of armed conflicts it is even possible to observe in practice a kind 
of formal convergence of status between human combatants and “animal sol-
diers” to an extent that is until now almost unheard of in other areas of social 
life. Attention might be drawn in this regard to the existence of war memorials 
either specifically devoted to certain animals or at least also featuring animals 
as active combat participants in a number of countries. On 21 July 1994, on the 
fiftieth anniversary of the invasion of Guam, the Marine War Dog Memorial 
was unveiled at the United States Marine Corps War Dog Cemetery on the 
                                                             
2  On the outstanding importance of this factor see for example Hediger (2013, 1: “What does 
it really mean that a dog was deemed critical to the operation of this extremely rigorous, 
strictly trained military unit engaging the United States‘ perhaps most important early 21st 
century mission? […] The presence of the dog on the Osama Bin Laden mission, like the use 
of animals in other wars, also indicates human limitations and human reliance upon other 
species. A dog accompanied the SEALs because he or she could do things no human, and not 
even any human-made machine, could do”). 
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island, dedicated to the twenty-five dogs killed “liberating Guam in 1944.” To 
mention but one further example, the Animals in War Memorial was unveiled 
in London on 24 November 2004 (concerning these examples as well as gener-
ally on this practice see, e.g., Kean 2013; Johnston 2012). Furthermore, and 
indeed mirroring this formal status approximation even more obviously, there 
is the previous and current practice of decorating “animal soldiers” that have 
distinguished themselves in battles in some countries like the United Kingdom 
and the former German Empire. Medals and decorations have been awarded in 
this connection for example to horses, dogs, pigeons and cats.3 In addition, the 
United States Congress adopted a law in December 2012 aimed at the protec-
tion and support of retired military dogs by, inter alia, streamlining the adop-
tion process and authorizing a system of veterinary care for retired canines. 
Finally, it seems also worth noticing in the present context that in particular 
dogs are occasionally – and at least unofficially – given higher military ranks 
“that make them senior to their handlers, a practice designed to ensure that the 
humans treat the animals with deference. They have a rank patch on their body 
armor” (Londono 2014). 
A third notable aspect, illustrating from an overarching normative and concep-
tual perspective the specific relevance and suitability of international humanitari-
an law in the present context, is the observation that the active participation of 
animals in armed conflicts might very well be regarded as a central inspirational 
and guiding social reference field.4 This is especially with regard to a conceptual 
re-orientation of a political theory of animal rights that emphases the importance 
of citizenship in the sense of an extended understanding of this concept based on 
the novel idea of “animal citizenship” (see in particular Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2011, 50 et seq., 101 et seq.; as well as, e.g., Kymlicka and Donaldson 2014). 
Taking into account that citizenship is – also in the context of a political theory of 
animal rights (Kymlicka and Donaldson 2014, 205 et seq.; Donaldson and 
Kymlicka 2011, 13, 116, 122; Ahlhaus and Niesen 2015, in this HSR Forum) – 
typically and rightly understood as a legal status involving not only rights but 
also certain responsibilities towards the respective political community and its 
members, one of the important civic obligations traditionally recognized first and 
foremost also in free democratic societies is the ordering idea of general conscrip-
                                                             
3  On this practice see for example with regard to the former German Empire Pöppinghege 
(2009, 238); as well as for the United Kingdom Johnston (2012, 368-9: “The British decorate 
animals. The Dickin Medal, named after the founder of the People’s Dispensary for Sick An-
imals, Maria Dickin, functions as the animal version of the Victoria Cross. Animals receive 
plaudits for bravery, courage, and devotion to duty. The Medal reads ‘For Gallantry, We also 
Serve,’ suggesting patriotic oneness between human and animal. World War II saw 49 med-
als awarded”). 
4  Generally on the recourse to and importance of reference fields as a dogmatic approach in 
jurisprudence see, e.g., Schmidt-Aßmann (2013, 8 et seq.); Voßkuhle (2012, paras. 43 et seq., 
each with further references). 
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tion.5 If there is any area of life where certain types of animals are – already for a 
very long time and also in the public perception as a whole – “called on” to assist 
in the protection of a (human) political community in a quasi-civic manner, it is 
in the course of their active participation in international and non-international 
armed conflicts6 and thus in the material scope of application of international 
humanitarian law. The undeniable fact that these services are frequently provided 
by the animals in question without or even against their will, probably does not 
categorically distinguish them from the majority of human combatants’ respec-
tive attitude. 
A final aspect worth considering in the present context adopts something 
like a strategic or implementation-oriented perspective. The ius in bello also 
presents itself as a particularly suitable research and reference field for a politi-
cal theory of animal rights, because in light of current and future technological 
developments this area of public international law is highly likely – and con-
siderably more urgent and accentuated than other legal fields – to be confronted 
with the practical relevant issue whether to enlarge its scope of applications to 
actors other than humans and those traditional subjects of law comprising of 
humans (see infra under 5.). Already against this background, it appears not too 
far-fetched to presume that the legal policy fora and discourses on international 
humanitarian law are, compared to those in other areas of law, currently and in 
the foreseeable future considerably more receptive towards seriously discussing 
questions concerning the possible recognition of a legal status for animals. 
3.  De lege lata: The Status of “Animal Combatants” in the 
Current Laws of Armed Conflict 
When taking a closer look at the structure and content of international humani-
tarian law according to the current political theory of animals’ rights, it is of 
value to start with a brief stock-taking of its present normative framework in 
general and its applicability to animals in particular. Such an approach will help 
not only to identify the main regulatory approaches currently dominating in re-
spective legal practice, but most certainly also to lay the foundations for a pro-
gressive development in this area of law aimed at implementing some of the 
                                                             
5  On this perception see for example the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany in BVerfGE 48, 127 (161); as well as from the literature, e.g., Stern (1994, 1029: 
“civic duty par excellence”); Heun (2013, 1315: “republican civic obligation”); Götz (1983, 
23: “a fundamental obligation of citizens”) (translations by the author); generally on the 
concept of fundamental civic duties from the perspective of constitutional law see for ex-
ample Randelzhofer (2006); Hofmann (2011). 
6  Generally on the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts 
and its relevance in the ius in bello see, e.g., Fleck (2013, 603 et seq.); Klabbers (2013, 207 et 
seq.); Shaw (2014, 864 et seq.). 
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conceptual ideas that have more recently been articulated in the realm of ani-
mal rights theory. 
To start off with a summary of the results, the findings with regard to the 
current state of international humanitarian law are with a view to a political 
theory of animal rights rather disillusioning. Despite the history of wartime 
activities also being characterized by environmental damages (Vöneky and 
Wolfrum 2011, paras. 2 et seq.), the international legal protection of the envi-
ronment itself under conditions of international and non-international armed 
conflicts is on the basis of treaty law, as well as customary international law, 
widely perceived to be rather poorly developed.7 There are indeed only com-
paratively few rules in the modern laws of war that directly protect the envi-
ronment against the harmful consequences of armed conflict. Prominent exam-
ples for such obligations are the respective normative rules of behavior 
stipulated in Articles 35 (3) and 55 (1) of the First Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts (1977 GC Protocol I) of 8 June 1977 as well 
as in the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile Use of Envi-
ronmental Modification Techniques of 10 December 1976 (1976 ENMOD 
Convention), all of which taken together prohibit methods and means of com-
bat which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term 
and severe damage to the natural environment (on this aspect as well as more 
generally on the protection of the environment under international humanitarian 
law see, e.g., Oeter 2013, 211 et seq.; Thürer 2008, 77 et seq.; Boothby 2009, 86 
et seq.; Dinstein 2001). And even with regard to these and other relevant provi-
sions, it needs to be emphasized in the present context, that the regime of interna-
tional humanitarian law does not in general protect the environment per se but is 
first and foremost intended to avoid negative consequences for the affected 
(human) civilian population indirectly caused by damage to the environment.8 
This is vividly illustrated by the additional requirement as enshrined in Article 
55 (1) of the 1977 GC Protocol I stipulating that damage to the natural envi-
ronment is only of relevance for the purposes of this provision if it is intended 
or may be expected also to “prejudice the health or survival of the population.” 
Furthermore, this primarily anthropocentric perspective is, for example, also 
mirrored in the following statement made by the International Court of Justice 
in its advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons of 
8 July 1996: “The Court also recognizes that the environment is not an abstrac-
                                                             
7  On this perception see for example Beyerlin and Marauhn (2011, 419: “Pertinent treaty 
obligations are relatively weak”); Vöneky and Wolfrum (2011, para. 49: “Customary interna-
tional law has not yet developed rules on the conduct of armed activities which provide for 
an adequate protection of the environment. Treaty law is equally inadequate”); Vöneky 
(2001, 76); von Arnauld (2014, 516). 
8  On this perception see for example (Spieker 2008, 766: “it might be unavoidable to recog-
nise the human being as reference point in the context of IHL“); von Arnauld (2014, 516). 
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tion but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of 
human beings, including generations unborn.”9  
Even if one takes into account that, during armed conflicts, states are also 
increasingly expected to observe their obligations entered into on the basis of 
international treaties relating generally to the protection of the environment,10 
such a broadening of the legal analysis does not reveal more promising results, 
at least from the perspective of a political theory of animal rights. It is un-
doubtedly the case that the development of international environmental law has 
particularly in recent decades been characterized by the conclusion of numer-
ous bilateral, regional and multilateral conventions relating to the protection of 
animals (see, e.g., Kiss and Shelton 2004, 399 et seq.; Beyerlin and Marauhn 
2011, 181 et seq.; Bowman 1989). Furthermore, it is incontrovertible that these 
international agreements have the potential to exercise important normative 
steering functions especially in the context of international and non-
international armed conflicts (Vöneky 2001, 105 et seq.). However, it should 
be recalled that all of these various treaties and conventions are also shaped by 
the same anthropocentric perception or mirror at best so-called “welfarist” or 
“ecological” regulatory approaches and motivations; attitudes that are consid-
ered to be neither effective nor appropriate from the perspective of political 
animal rights theory (for a vivid example of this criticism see Donaldson and 
Kymlicka 2011, 3 et seq.; Ahlhaus and Niesen 2015, in this HSR Forum). 
In light of these findings, it seems unavoidable to conclude that the innova-
tive ordering idea of animals as subjects of law – and thus also as bearers of 
certain legal rights and/or obligations – has to date found notable recognition 
neither in the normative framework of international environmental law nor in 
the global regime of international humanitarian law. In particular the scope of 
application of the ius in bello – as strongly indicated by its more recent labeling 
as international “humanitarian” law – has always been and continues to be 
exclusively human-oriented. Consequently, despite the fact that certain animals 
are quite frequently allowed or required to “participate directly in hostilities” in 
the sense of Article 43 (2) of the 1977 GC Protocol I, they are not granted the 
rights and do not have the obligations deriving from the legal status of combat-
ants under international humanitarian law. Although it is precisely this status of 
combatants that has more recently again become subject to a quite intensive 
and controversial discussion among practitioners and scholars of international 
humanitarian law (see generally, e.g., Gasser and Melzer 2012, 80 et seq.; Ipsen 
2013), the possibility of an international legal status for “animal soldiers” is not 
                                                             
9  ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ-Reports (1996, 
226; 242, para. 29). 
10  On the respective discussion in international legal practice and literature see, e.g., Beyerlin 
and Marauhn (2011, 417 et seq.); Vöneky (2001, 76 et seq.); ICJ, Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ-Reports (1996, 226; 242, paras. 30 et seq.). 
HSR 40 (2015) 4  │  136 
addressed therein and thus irrelevant as far as these recent debates are concerned. 
Indeed, the only explicit reference to animals in general within the current 
framework of international humanitarian law is hidden in Article 7 (1) lit j of the 
1996 Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
Traps and Other Devices to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects of 10 October 1980, prohibiting the 
use of booby-traps and other devices which are in any way attached to or associ-
ated with “animals or their carcasses.” In addition, certain categories of animals – 
including a confirmation of their current status as mere objects of law – are men-
tioned for example in Article 4 of the Annex to the Convention (IV) Respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907 (IV. Hague Conven-
tion of 1907) stipulating that prisoners of war have the right to keep all their 
personal belongings, “except arms, horses, and military papers,”11 and in Article 
54 of the 1977 GC Protocol I addressing the “protection of objects indispensable 
to the survival of the civilian population” and, in this regard, prohibiting inter alia 
the destruction and removal of “livestock.”12  
4.  De lege ferenda: Chances and Challenges of Extending 
the Personal Scope of Application of International 
Humanitarian Law to “Animal Soldiers” 
The stock-taking in the foregoing section has clearly demonstrated that animals 
– despite their active participation in combat situations alongside human sol-
diers – are nevertheless a long way from enjoying any legal status or other 
normative recognition in the current regime of international humanitarian law. 
In other words, they are de lege lata no subjects of the ius in bello. However, 
this finding is also hardly surprising, in particular when considering the still 
very dominant perception of legal rules as being not only an exclusively man-
made steering phenomenon13 but also an entirely human-oriented ordering 
instrument. They are thus first and foremost considered as steering mechanisms 
                                                             
11  For a related provision see also, e.g., Article 18 of the 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relating 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949. 
12  See in this connection also for example Article 14 of the Second Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (1977 GC Protocol II) of 8 June 1977. 
13  On this perception see for example Loughlin (2010, 111: “There can be no law outside of the 
laws that humans give themselves“); Loughlin (2010, 312: “One compelling reason derives 
from the fact that law in the modern era is universally acknowledged to be a human crea-
tion“); von der Pfordten (2011, 156: “law is necessarily a kind of human action”); Domingo 
(2010, 123 et seq.); as well as already Jellinek (1913, 162 et seq.). 
HSR 40 (2015) 4  │  137 
that are solely addressed to human beings as well as organizations created by 
human beings, among them states, associations and international organizations 
(see, e.g., Ehlers 2013, 472; Kaufmann 2004, 96; as well as from the realm of 
legal practice for example Verwaltungsgericht Hamburg, Neue Zeitschrift für 
Verwaltungsrecht 1988, 1058; Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt/Main, Neue Juris-
tische Wochenschrift 2001, 1296). The Latin saying hominum cause omne ius 
constitutum, frequently attributed to the Roman jurist Aurelius Hermogenianus 
(Pennitz 2004), that for different reasons has not always shaped the character 
and orientation of public international law,14 is at least in the context of this 
contribution obviously still exercising a dominating influence on our under-
standing and perception of law. 
Nevertheless, in case one is willing to disengage oneself from such an ex-
clusively human-oriented pre-understanding of the concept of law15 as well as 
to consider the possibility of extending the circle of potential subjects of (inter-
national) law based on an inclusion of other actors like animals – and there 
appear to be in principle some good reasons for such a partial re-
conceptualization16 – there might be a way forward. It could indeed be argued 
that recognizing an international legal status of “animal soldiers” based on 
extending the personal scope of application of international humanitarian law 
should be regarded as a valuable opportunity for contributing to the accom-
plishment of a fundamental concern of animal rights theory – namely to recon-
struct the relationships between humans and animals “in ways that are respect-
ful, compassionate, and non-exploitative” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 10) 
– under the extreme circumstances of armed conflicts. 
The recognition of an international legal status as combatants would allow 
those animals, that for example have been wounded and are therefore incapable 
of defending themselves or that have fallen into the power of an adverse party, 
                                                             
14  On the increasing importance of this maxim in the current international legal order see, e.g., 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Dusco Tadic, Deci-
sion of the Appeals Chamber of 2 October 1995, reprinted in: International Legal Materials 
35 (1996, 32; 63, para. 67: “A State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually sup-
planted by a human-being-oriented approach. Gradually the maxim of Roman law homi-
num causa omne jus constitutum est (all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has 
gained a firm foothold in the international community as well”); Klabbers, Peters and Ulf-
stein (2009, 155: “Constitutionalism, […], postulates that natural persons are the ultimate 
unit of legal concern. Global constitutionalists abandon the idea that sovereign states are 
the material source of international norms. In consequence, the ultimate normative source 
of international law is – from a constitutionalist perspective – humanity, not sovereignty”); 
as well as Peters (2014); and Teitel (2011, 3 et seq.), each with numerous further references. 
15  Generally on the importance of respective pre-understandings in the context of legal norms 
and their interpretation see for example Esser (1972, 21 et seq). 
16  On the respective discussion in the literature see, e.g., Raspé (2013, 62 et seq.); Donaldson 
and Kymlicka (2011, 4 et seq., 19 et seq.); Ladwig (2010); Richter (2007, 344 et seq.), each 
with further references. Specifically from the perspective of public international law see 
also already D’Amato and Chopra (1991). 
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to benefit from the rather comprehensive and effective protection under inter-
national humanitarian law for so-called “enemies hors de combat” in the sense 
of Article 41 of the 1977 GC Protocol I (generally on this protection regime 
see, e.g., von Arnauld 2014, 519 et seq.; Ipsen 2014, 1229 et seq.). Beyond that 
and in compliance with one of the central guiding principles of international 
humanitarian law as for example codified as the so-called “Martens clause”  
- in the Preamble of the IV. Hague Convention of 1907, in Article 63 (4) of 
the 1949 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949,  
- in the Preamble of the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (1977 GC Protocol II) of 8 June 1977 as well as  
- in Article 1 (2) of the 1977 GC Protocol I,17  
“animal soldiers” would, to the same extent as human civilians and combatants, 
even in those circumstances and with regard to those issues that are until now 
not covered by applicable international agreements “remain under the protec-
tion and authority of the principles of international law derived from estab-
lished custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public 
conscience” (Article 1 (2) 1977 GC Protocol I). Consequently, assuming that 
these animals would be granted the status of combatants, the treatment they are 
legally entitled to receive in armed conflicts would also have to be guided and 
determined by the overarching purpose of realizing and maintaining the princi-
ples of humanity (to be understood in a considerably broader sense) as one of 
the normative core requirements of today’s ius in bello.18  
Even in light of these notable opportunities, a respective extension in the 
scope of international humanitarian law’s application to animals as active par-
ticipants in armed conflicts would certainly also give rise to a number of chal-
                                                             
17  See for example the respective stipulation in the Preamble of the Convention (IV) Respect-
ing the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907 (IV. Hague Convention of 
1907): “Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contract-
ing Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the 
rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established 
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public con-
science.” Generally on the content and relevance of the Martens Clause in international 
humanitarian law see also, e.g., Meron (2000); Cassese (2000); Rensmann (2008). 
18  On the perception that the principle of humanity constitute one of the central ordering 
ideas of the laws of armed conflict see for example Thürer (2008, 66: “This principle is at the 
heart of international humanitarian law”); von Arnauld (2014, 481); as well as ICJ, Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ-Reports (1996, 226; 257, 
para. 79: “It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in 
armed conflict are so fundamental to the respect of the human person and ‘elementary 
considerations of humanity’ […] that the Hague and Geneva Conventions have enjoyed a 
broad accession”). 
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lenges. Aside from the currently rather uncertain prospects for reforming the 
ius in bello (see also infra under 5), the following evaluation in this section 
largely confines itself to an identification and discussion of two overarching 
difficulties that need to be taken into account and to be adequately addressed in 
the present context. Firstly, there is the need to clearly define which types of 
animals should realistically be granted a respective status. Secondly, the ques-
tion arises of how to adequately address the rather limited capacity of animals 
to observe consciously the respective obligations normally arising for combat-
ants under the laws of war based on considerations of “humanity.” 
The first challenging aspect concerns the question of which animal catego-
ries actively participating in armed conflicts should legitimately and realistically 
be included in the scope of application of international humanitarian law. There is 
almost general agreement in philosophical-political discourses that for a variety 
of reasons not all types of animals – or at least not all categories to the same 
extent – appear to be suitable to become addressees of respective legal rights (see, 
e.g., Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 6; Ladwig 2010, 131 et seq.). However, the 
individual answers given in scholarly contributions differ considerably. Further-
more, the respective criteria to be applied in this regard are not infrequently de-
fined in rather vague terms. To mention but one example, Sue Donaldson and 
Will Kymlicka argue for the granting of legal entitlements to all animals “pos-
sessing a subjective existence – that is, to all animals that have some threshold 
level of consciousness or sentience” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 6). 
However, from the perspective of legal practice and the science of law as a 
primarily practice-oriented discipline,19 the continued use of such an ambigu-
ous terminology and consequently an unclear determination in the scope of 
international humanitarian law’s application is obviously incompatible with 
one of the rule of law’s overarching central purposes, namely the protection 
and promotion of legal certainty (generally, e.g., von Arnauld 2006; specifical-
ly in the present context Raspé 2013, 308). Rather, a possible future animal-
oriented reformation of international humanitarian law would first and fore-
most essentially require a normative specification – admittedly only within the 
limited guidance that the “vagueness of legal language” can provide in this 
connection (Alexy 1989, 1; see also, e.g., Hart 1997, 126) – of the animal cate-
gories that are granted the legal status of combatants. The present contribution 
deliberately abstains from making detailed suggestions in this regard. Never-
theless, it is submitted that considerations relating to the feasibility and accept-
ability of such reformation suggest that the respective ambitions should at least 
initially be confined to including in the scope of the ius in bello some suitable 
candidates such as military dogs on which a necessary international consensus 
might be comparatively easier to reach. 
                                                             
19  On this perception see, e.g., Alexy (2002, 9); Voßkuhle (2010, 340); Jestaedt (2014, 3 et seq.). 
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The second overarching challenge relates to the observation that recognition 
as combatants under international humanitarian law involves not only the en-
joyment of certain rights and privileges but also – at least indirectly – an impo-
sition of certain legal obligations. In order to implement and promote the prin-
ciple of humanity in armed conflicts effectively, state parties to the respective 
international agreements are required to enact domestic legislation providing 
for penal sanctions to cover certain grave breaches of the ius in bello. Respec-
tive obligations are stipulated for example in:  
- Articles 49 and 50 of the 1949 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 
12 August 1949,  
- Articles 129 and 130 of the 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relating to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949,  
- Articles 146 and 147 of the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relating to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 as well as in  
- Articles 85 and 86 of the 1977 GC Protocol I  
(generally on the enforcement of international humanitarian law see, e.g., 
Detter 2013, 419 et seq.; Vöneky 2013; Gaeta 2014; Bothe 2013, 640 et seq.). 
In addition, attention should be drawn in this regard to relevant developments 
in the realm of international criminal law (see for example Werle and Jeßberger 
2014, 327 et seq.; Detter 2013, 452 et seq.; von Arnauld 2014, 532 et seq.). 
Against this background the question arises whether and, in the affirmative, 
how these legal requirements are to be enforced vis-à-vis animal combatants. In 
the context of animal rights theory, whether or not animals truly have the ca-
pacity to be legitimate addressees of moral obligations has been the subject of 
fierce debate for some time (see, e.g., Raspé 2013, 71 et seq.; Ladwig 2010, 
135 et seq.). More specifically, the same seems currently to be valid with re-
gard to the discussions on a political theory of animal rights (Donaldson and 
Kymlicka 2011, 116 et seq.). Even if one applies the last-mentioned theoretical 
framework to animals at war, considers their participation in armed conflicts as 
a kind of manifestation and realization of conscription, and thus their civic 
obligation to contribute to the protection of a political community (see supra 
under 2.), and, as a consequence, perceives these animals in principle also as 
addressees of certain legal obligations, one particular challenge cannot serious-
ly be denied. A sober evaluation – to put it mildly – gives rise to certain doubts 
of whether or not the average animal combatant can seriously be regarded as 
being endowed with the capacity to understand and autonomously obey the 
various legal obligations incumbent upon active participants in armed conflicts 
under international humanitarian law.20 
                                                             
20  Generally on the perception that animals lack the capacity to observe “man-made legal 
obligations” see also Raspé (2013, 287 et seq.). 
HSR 40 (2015) 4  │  141 
What implications should we draw from these findings? Well, not necessari-
ly the quite far-reaching consequence that animals are in light of these “defi-
cits” for overarching structural and legal dogmatic reasons also not entitled to 
the protection and privileges deriving from the legal status of combatants. In 
order to illustrate and support this thesis further, three main aspects are worth 
highlighting in the present context. First, it appears appropriate to recall that the 
domestic law of states – in the same way as for example the international legal 
regime on the protection of human rights – rightly takes for granted the legal 
personality and subjectivity in general, as well as the capacity to be bearer of 
human and other fundamental rights in particular, also of those human beings 
which are – due to respective stipulations in the normative realms of contractu-
al capacity, of the responsibility for torts and of criminal responsibility – only 
to a limited extent addressees of legal obligations. This approach finds its justi-
fication in the fact that these human beings are – in this respect from a factual 
perspective to a certain extent comparable to animals – not, not yet, or no long-
er endowed with the capacity to understand and autonomously fulfill certain 
legal rules of behavior. As also frequently emphasized in the discussions on 
animal rights themselves, these characteristics apply, among others, to small 
children and persons with severe intellectual disabilities (Donaldson and 
Kymlicka 2011, 22 et seq.; Ladwig 2010, 135 et seq.; Raspé 2013, 289 et seq.). 
Admittedly, many readers are likely, at least at first sight, to consider the 
two last-mentioned groups of human beings as rather inappropriate and uncon-
vincing examples in the present context, taking into account that the recruit-
ment and use of children as well as mentally handicapped persons as soldiers in 
armed conflicts is fortunately and for absolutely convincing reasons forbidden 
under public international law. With regard to children, the respective prohibi-
tion can be found, inter alia, in Article 77 (2) of the 1977 GC Protocol I, Article 
4 (3) of the 1977 GC Protocol II and in the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict of 
25 May 2000 (generally, e.g., Happold 2005, 54 et seq.). A related prohibition 
concerning persons with severe intellectual disabilities can be derived, for exam-
ple, from Article 11 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
of 13 December 2006 as well as from the state parties’ protective duties towards 
sick members of the armed forces under Article 12 of the of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949 and under Article 10 of the 1977 
GC Protocol I. In light of these findings, one might be tempted to argue that the 
use of animals in armed conflicts could and should also be subjected to a com-
prehensive ban under the ius in bello. However, such a perception is not only 
incompatible with current state practice, but it also appears doubtful whether an 
unconditional and comprehensive prohibition would be consistent with the 
central concern of the new political theory of animal rights, namely to recog-
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nize domesticated animals as emancipated fellow citizens of human political 
communities (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 101 et seq.). 
The analysis has so far revealed beyond reasonable doubt that domestic le-
gal systems generally do not consider the ability to observe legal obligations as 
a necessary prerequisite for the recognition of legal personality of the actor at 
issue. Furthermore, to mention a second notable aspect, it is worth recalling 
that the same applies to general public international law. Admittedly, the exist-
ence of a kind of inseparable connection between the status of actors as a bear-
er of international legal entitlements on the one hand and its position as an 
addressee of international normative obligations on the other hand has occa-
sionally been argued for in the legal literature (see, e.g., the references provided 
by Nowrot 2012, 7 et seq.). However, at least on the basis of the currently still 
prevailing dogmatic approach to international legal subjectivity, that relies 
exclusively on the granting by states of specific rights and/or obligations under 
international law to the actor in question,21 the assumption of a necessary inter-
relationship between rights and obligations appears to be impermissible (Now-
rot 2012, 15 et seq., with further references). Consequently, also public interna-
tional law is far from alien to the concept and possibility of legal subjects that 
are only beneficiaries of normative entitlements without being at the same time 
compelled to observe certain international obligations. A well-known and much 
debated example is the current status of private corporations in the frameworks 
of international human rights law and international investment law (Nowrot 
2012, 8 et seq., with further references). 
A third and final main aspect worth drawing attention to in the present con-
text is the observation that a legal recognition of animals as combatants, with-
out at the same time establishing a corresponding obligation for them to ob-
serve the requirements of the ius in bello, would also not lead to any new and 
additional enforcement deficits with regard to international humanitarian law. 
Rather, any violations of the laws of war committed by or at least with the 
assistance of animal soldiers will, in the same way as it is already currently the 
case, continue to be attributed to those human combatants who have deployed 
the animals and are thus also responsible for supervising them appropriately. At 
least in this respect, the attribution of responsibility with regard to animal con-
duct will, in either case, also in the future continue to be based on the same 
legal principles as those already currently applying to the use of weapons or the 
recourse to other methods and means of combat. 
In particular in light of this last-mentioned consideration it is submitted that 
the general inability of animal soldiers to obey the obligations under interna-
tional humanitarian law autonomously does not in principle hinder their recog-
nition as combatants and the granting of the protective rights associated with 
                                                             
21  Generally thereto, e.g., Jennings and Watts (1992, 16); Focarelli (2012, 238); Klabbers (2003, 
367). 
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this legal status. Nevertheless, the continued necessity of comprehensively22 
attributing the activities of animal soldiers to the respective human combatants 
undoubtedly constitutes a clear distinction between animals and humans. In 
light of these differences, it appears appropriate and advisable from a legal 
policy perspective not to transfer and extend the current concept of (human) 
combatants “lock, stock, and barrel” to animal soldiers but rather create a new 
separate category of animal combatants under international humanitarian law. 
5.  Outlook: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Might Clear the 
Way or On a Possible “Window of Opportunity” 
The analysis above has focused primarily on the chances of and challenges 
arising in connection with the possible inclusion of animal soldiers into the 
scope of application of international humanitarian law. In this regard, it has 
been demonstrated that no fundamental conceptual and dogmatic objections 
exist that would prevent a respective animal-oriented reformation of the ius in 
bello. Nevertheless, a realistic assessment of this issue should finally not dodge 
the equally thorny questions as to the chances in practice for such a more or 
less fundamental reorientation of international humanitarian law. 
In principle, such an assessment of the conditions for and chances of suc-
cessfully realizing this approach towards animal rights in practice is most cer-
tainly possible and relevant for all of the different areas of law. That said, the 
outcome might nevertheless differ considerably, depending on the individual 
field of law in question. As already indicated (see supra under 2), a valid argu-
ment can indeed be made in this regard that the field of international humani-
tarian law could in the medium-term perspective have – from the point of view 
of animal rights theory – something like a pioneering function in legal practice. 
In order to avoid the danger of becoming outmoded by newly invented methods 
and means of combat and thereby considerably limiting its normative steering 
functions and claim to effectiveness,23 the normative regime of the ius in bello 
is particularly dependent upon the competence to anticipate, and to provide a 
timely legal framework for, future technological developments in the area of 
                                                             
22  It should not be left unmentioned that the dogmatic structure of international humanitari-
an law is already currently – in the relations between human combatants – in principle not 
alien to the approach of attributing the responsibility for the conduct of subordinate sol-
diers in accordance with the so-called principles of “command responsibility” as for example 
stipulated in the Articles 86 (2) and 87 of the 1977 GC Protocol I. However, in contrast to 
the relationship between human and animal soldiers, this attribution between human be-
ings of different military ranks is far from comprehensive. Generally on the concept of 
command responsibility see, e.g., Dinstein (2010, 271 et seq.). 
23  Generally on the perception that law is inherently striving for an effective enforcement see, 
e.g., Radbruch (1964, 13); Kirchhof (1987, 45); Tietje (2001, 267 et seq.). 
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weaponry.24 Against this background, it seems appropriate to draw attention to 
the widely shared expectation that international humanitarian law and its law-
making actors are in the foreseeable future highly likely to be confronted with 
the question of how to legally cope with a number of other categories of “non-
human combatants,” particularly in the form of autonomous combat systems. 
Admittedly, the present generation of unmanned combat aerial vehicles, also 
known for example as combat drones and currently almost omnipresent in the 
respective public discussions, is by no means an autonomous weapon system 
but is usually operating under real-time human control exercised by an operator 
in a remote terminal. This factor is also precisely one of the reasons why the 
use of current combat drones in armed conflicts is not per se a violation of 
international humanitarian law (see, e.g., Nowrot 2013, 8 et seq., with further 
references). However, there are indications that within the next two or three 
decades technical developments are likely to permit the creation of entirely 
autonomous combat systems for air, land and sea warfare.25  
It hardly needs to be emphasized that the use of such autonomously operat-
ing weapon systems – often plainly called “killer robots” – in armed conflicts 
gives rise to a considerable number of challenging questions from the perspec-
tive of international humanitarian law (for an overview see, e.g., Nowrot 2013, 
19 et seq., with further references). Nevertheless, in the present context of 
animal rights, the only relevant issue concerns the question of how the ius in 
bello will be progressively developed in order to address these new technologi-
cal developments. On the one hand, it would certainly be possible to prohibit 
proactively the possession and use of autonomous combat systems on the basis 
of respective international agreements and thus make them join the class of 
outlawed weapons, which include anti-personnel mines and blinding laser 
weapons (generally on prohibited weapons under international humanitarian 
law Dinstein 2010, 67 et seq.; Boothby 2009, 106 et seq.; Detter 2013, 243 et 
seq.). Indeed, respective initiatives aimed at or at least considering a future 
prohibition of lethal autonomous weapons systems have recently emerged for 
example at the European26 as well as the global level.27  
                                                             
24  Generally on this perception see for example already ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in 
the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, ICJ-Reports (1949, 
174, 178: “Throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced 
by the requirements of international life”). 
25  See, e.g, McDonnell (2012, 315: “there now is ‘massive spending’ to develop completely 
autonomous weapons that take ‘humans out of the loop’”); Boor (2011, 103); Conde 
Jiminián (2011, 90); as well as Singer (2009, 123 et seq.). 
26  See for example European Parliament Resolution of 27 February 2014 on the Use of Armed 
Drones (2014/2567(RSP)), para. 2 lit. d (“ban the development, production and use of fully 
autonomous weapons which enable strikes to be carried out without human intervention“). 
27  For respective activities at the global level see, e.g., United Nations Security Council, Report 
of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, UN Doc. 
S/2013/689 of 22 November 2013, para. 29; United Nations General Assembly, Report of the 
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On the other hand, in the not unlikely case that the relevant countries are un-
able to reach an agreement on a comprehensive prohibition of these “robots,” 
one might also consider, in the interest of a continued effectiveness of the ius in 
bello, the possibility and feasibility of a new accentuation of the legal principles 
mentioned above dealing with the attribution of responsibility for war crimes (see 
supra under 4). This could also include modifying and enlarging the scope of 
international humanitarian law’s application in order to engage directly and legal-
ly with at least some of these autonomous systems on the basis of a new and 
more inclusive understanding of the concept of legal subjectivity.28 It is precisely 
under such circumstances, one could argue, that the international community 
might also be more willing to discuss a possible legal status for animal soldiers 
within a more comprehensive reformation of the laws of war in general and the 
scope of this normative regime’s application in particular. 
These ideas and considerations are likely to be regarded by many readers as 
rather utopian, including those that are favorably disposed towards a prompt 
realization of animal rights in practice. Against this background, and in re-
sponse to these sceptics, the present contribution concludes with two final 
remarks. First, realistically assessing the current chances of implementing the 
animal rights concept in legal practice clearly suggests the need for some kind 
of what might be labeled “external innovation impulse” in order to bring the 
issue of animal rights successfully onto the agenda of the relevant lawmaking 
actors in the international system. This applies first and foremost also to a 
respective reformation of the ius in bello. Second, albeit closely related to the 
foregoing consideration, despite all enthusiasm for the ordering idea of (politi-
cal) animal rights shown by its supporters, it appears necessary and appropri-
ately sobering to recall that also this project is still considered by most people 
to be quite utopian. In light of these findings it might very well be true that it is 
precisely the approach, argued for in this section, of linking the two so far 
rather unrelated visions of animal rights on the one hand and so-called “robot 
rights” on the other hand that has a certain potential to generate in the future a 
new legal reality in the realm of international humanitarian law. 
                                                                                                                                
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47 
of 9 April 2013, paras. 26 et seq.; Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Conven-
tion on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May 
Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Report of the 2014 
Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), 
CCW/MSP/2014/3 of 11 June 2014. 
28  On the debates in the literature concerning a possible legal subjectivity of autonomous 
systems see generally for example Kersten (2015); as well as specifically in the present con-
text of armed conflicts Singer (2009, 403 et seq.); Krishnan (2009, 138 et seq.). 
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